MEI recently hosted a panel of four distinguished speakers to discuss the implications of U.S. drone policy in the Middle East. Titled, From Boots on the Ground to Drones in the Sky: How Are New Forms of “Hard Power” Affecting America’s Position in the Middle East?, the seminar featured Dr. Ahmed Salah Hashim, Associate Professor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Dr. Leila Hudson, Associate Professor at the University of Arizona, MEI’s Visiting Research Professor Robert Bianchi and Mr. Issandr El-Amrani, a prominent analyst of Middle Eastern affairs and a blogger at The Arabist (arabist.net).

Hashim placed emphasis on the implications of new military technologies on human lives. The fascination for airpower is a crucial factor in the emergence and popularity of the drone warfare in the U.S., which now possesses over 7,000 drones. The risk to civilians is highlighted by the fact that it took 16 strikes, 14 months and approximately 300 deaths just to kill Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the Pakistani Taliban. Another adverse effect of the drone policy has been the complete unraveling of social structures as people live in a permanent state of fear, unable to conduct life normally.

Since drones have proven to bear little political costs as opposed to ground operations, this has lowered the threshold for democracies to enter into combat. Hashim argued that drone warfare has transformed the U.S. presidency into the most powerful office in the world in at least half a century, as the “kill list” requires very minimal oversight.

Hudson paid close attention to the trends in drone warfare over the recent years. She addressed three key areas: the rising lethality of drone warfare, its unintended consequences and its rapid proliferation. The AfPak region saw an increase in the rate of drone strikes up until 2011, which now include targets in Yemen. From 2009 till 2010, for every “high value target” attacked, there were 147 accompanying civilian deaths – a dramatic increase in comparison to the 1:5 ratio from 2002 till 2004.

Unintended consequences of drone warfare include retaliation from, and the radicalization of, the local populace, as well as operational and strategic confusion – all of which reinforces the self-fulfilling prophecy of the “War on Terror.” Support for the policy and the proliferation of drones is also rapidly increasing, as the industry – expected to be valued at $82 billion by 2025 – continues to provide jobs in an economically fragile environment. As the drone lobby gains power, we may see economic factors being prioritized over strategic goals; in essence, a further expansion of the military-industrial complex.

Bianchi approached the topic from the perspective of international law. The U.S., although leading in terms of technology, is lagging with regards to international law and public opinion. The legal justifications for killing U.S. citizens without due process and the wider drone programme are extremely dubious and based on a vague analogy that was given during the recent speech by Obama on drone policy. Nevertheless, Bianchi pointed out that with the rise of drone warfare, there is also a process of international law that is being made to address the issue.

El-Amrani viewed the issue from a unique perspective – that of the Arab world. Although drones do not have a marked presence in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, they still contribute to the deteriorating image of the U.S. in these countries, which fuels the growing anti-U.S. sentiment in the wider region. The death of civilians as a direct result of the U.S. drone policy is an issue that is frequently raised in the Arab world, on top of American military expansions in the region. Many view drones as a cowardly tactic as it allows one side to completely escape the reality of war, while the other bears the consequences. In addition, drone warfare allows states to ignore long-term political solutions that address the root of the matter as they resort to a quick fix.

In MEI’s most recent research seminar, Visiting Research Professor Lilia Labidi led discussions on the emergence of feminist literature, specifically literature of denunciation against political violence, in Tunisia. The themes in such feminist denunciations, which centred on sexual oppression in the 1980s, later expanded to include sociopolitical issues in the 2000s.

Literature by women in general, despite being an ancient phenomenon in the Arab world, remains marginal in discussions of world literature. Labidi noted that this is particularly true of French writing by Tunisian women, which has had “no real presence in France although it is significant in volume and often wins awards.” Labidi argued that the use of French by Tunisian women writers today no longer signals dependency. For example, Lina ben Mhenni, a 2011 Nobel Peace Prize nominee, had her blog on the Arab revolution, Tunisian Girl: Blogueuse pour un printemps arabe, published into a book and subsequently translated into German. Mhenni represents the new generation of multilingual women writers who “contribute toward the construction of a humanist culture and transnational modernity.”

In response to Labidi’s presentation, Asia Research Institute’s (ARI) Senior Research Fellow Rada Iveković asked how other women—beyond the class of women discussed, that is, educated elites—dealt with subordination. She thus highlighted that even public spaces built for women remain hegemonic due to class considerations. Another ARI Senior Research Fellow, Arun Bala, touched on the nuanced motivations behind different feminist movements in the Arab world, to which MEI Senior Research Fellow Ali Allawi commented that Arab feminist movements are invariably connected to autocracy or ideologically-linked parties.

The event took place from 12 to 13 June 2013. There were over 80 delegates from 35 different secondary schools in Singapore, and it was a highly sought after event that requests for participation exceeded the number of places available. MEI supported MES 2013 by way of judging the essay competition, guiding the research for the study guides, sponsoring the prizes and providing the organizers with a speaker for the opening address as well as guest lecturers. We are proud to announce that MES will continue on an annual basis with our support.

In her opening address for MES 2013 on Wednesday morning, MEI’s Deputy Director, Dr. Charlotte Schriwer, reminds the audience that despite the current upheavals that beleaguers the Middle East, it remains a region that is vibrant, hospitable, beautiful and immensely rich in history. MEI’s researchers, Dr. Fanar Haddad, Dr. Ali Kadri and Dr. Nazry Bahrawi, delivered the introductory lectures for the Political Committee, the Economic Development Committee and the Social and Humanitarian Committee of the Summit respectively.

As a research institute that specializes in the MENA region, MEI is thrilled to see the Middle East becoming a subject of interest amongst Singapore’s secondary schools, and is delighted to render its support in cultivating, nurturing and sustaining this interest through intellectual events such as MES 2013. Well done, ACS (Independent)!

Please click here for more information on MES 2013: http://middleeastsummit.org/

At the MEI seminar on “The Kremlin and the Jihadist Issue: Understanding the Russian Situation Today,” Didier Chaudet argued for a strong correlation between Russia’s nostalgia for its “Great Power” status from the Soviet period and the way the country has been dealing with the jihadist issue. Chaudet, a consultant on post-Soviet and South Asian security and foreign policy, focuses particularly on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia in his research. In the case of Russia, he argues that the country is attempting to reassert itself within its borders as well as internationally, which is allowing it some short term gains but will also create grave long-term consequences.

Chaudet spoke on three key areas: Islam in Russia, jihadism in Russia, and Russia and foreign jihadism. Though it would be convenient to characterize the relationship between Russia and Islam through its history of conquest and tension, Russia’s relationship to Islam is more complex than this vision of a perpetual state of war. The subject of Islam in Russia is a sensitive one in the country today. As conversions to Islam increase, some have expressed fears of an “Islamic” threat. However, a 2007 Gallup poll shows that religiosity is not what best defines the identity of many Russian Muslims, and it also seems that they are not eager to see an Islamic party represent them in the Duma, as historically Islamic parties have failed during elections. Therefore, an increased presence of Muslims should not change Russia dramatically.

Chaudet argued that a principal issue affecting jihadism in Russia is “the Putinian reaction,” which mainly concerns Putin’s reassertion of the Russian Federation as a Great Power in international affairs. Russian nostalgia for its Great Power status from the Soviet period has bred the desire to once again be a power with which to be reckoned. It is because of this “Putinian reaction” that a real jihadist problem now exists, not only in Chechnya, but in all of the North Caucasus, as Putin launched a second attack against Chechen independence and strengthened federal control throughout the country.

The presence of such a tense social and political situation in the region, coupled with the activism of jihadists, makes it clear that the North Caucasus is indeed a hotbed of radicalism in Russia. However, it would be a mistake to think that all of Russia is affected by jihadism or that the fears of a Tatar jihad are founded—at least for the time being. Although the Tatars, who are mostly Muslims, form the largest minority group in Russia, they are not seen as different from the Slav majority and are thus not victims of strong racism like the Caucasians. It is therefore highly unlikely that the Tatars would turn to jihadism.

Chaudet argues that concerns for Russian security should not stop only at its borders. Moscow should more seriously consider jihadist activism emanating from its close neighbours, namely post-Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan, particularly the Afghan and the Pakistani Pashtun border where the Taliban and their foreign jihadist auxiliaries are based. As a turbulent neighbour that has been threatening the stability of Central Asian states for the last two or three decades, and as a safe haven for international terrorists during this period, Afghanistan is and should be of direct concern for Russian security. However, it is not certain that Moscow understands this.

Stability in Central Asia is essential for Russian security and domestic politics. Destabilization of a state in this region would mean, at the very least, a larger flow of Muslim emigrants from Central Asia into Russia, which could further trigger the Russian extreme right, stir anti-Muslim sentiment, and reinforce links with criminal groups operating in the country.

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